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1. Introduction
Malawi's resources at Independence in 1964 were so
modest that the country depended on foreign support.
The first Development Plan (1965-69) affirmed: 'It is
essential for the fulfilment of the plans which are made
and the attainment of the prospects that lie ahead for
external capital to be made available to assist in the
financing of economic development'. Apart from
project capital, the recurrent expenditure of govern-
ment had to be supported by British subsidies; and a
backlog in local training and education delayed the
Malawianisation of key posts in both public and
private sectors. But after British subsidies to recurrent
budget were eliminated in 1971, concessional flows
were concentrated on new and often ambitious
development projects and on technical assistance.
This second phase saw donor assistance transformed
from an instrument designed to prop up a doubtfully
viable economy into a stimulus for growth and
expansion in a maturing if agriculture-based economy,
which during most of the I 970s registered impressive
growth without balance-of-payments instability. The
effects of the first 'oil shock' of 1973 were weathered
thanks to resilient export performance, an upturn in
commodity prices, and domestically-engineered
adjustment measures. Aid could be channelled largely
into new projects, with relatively less regard for
recurrent cost implications. Public savings were
released for alternative uses; over 1978 to 1980 the
government went to the Euromarkets for a spate of
borrowing at floating interest rates (soon to prove very
onerous).
After 1979, the economy faltered and stagnated as
Malawi began to face severe balance-of-payments
problems. The role of the aid donors had to change
once again. Following the initial IMF stand-by
agreement of 1979, the World Bank's programme of
Structural Adjustment Lending began in 1981, and
this led other donors into programmes concentrating
aid on measures to achieve economic policy reforms.
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From Independence to 1979, real growth in Malawi
averaged 5.5 per cent per year; over 1979-84 it fell to an
average of 2.6 per cent. However, the worst year of
recession was 1981, and the recovery since then has
been impressive, with a 6.7 per cent growth estimated
for 1984 (in the 1985 budget statement). Thus,
adjustment measures are already bearing fruit, and a
return to external balance is not being purchased at the
expense of undue loss of output.
Donor perceptions that aid in Malawi can be applied
effectively in a market-oriented environment are
largely drawn from the boom years of the 1970s. Do
such perceptions remain valid? A stylised account of
Malawi's favourable relationship with aid donors is
given below (Section 2), but reveals conflicts over
policy, often resolved in Malawi's favour. Section 3
gives the breakdown of recent aid flows to Malawi,
stressing the concentration on a narrow range of main
donors. Section 4 reviews the sectoral input in project
interventions - stressing agriculture and transport -
and more recent multilateral adjustment assistance.
Since our findings conflict with recent assertions that
Malawi suffers from the disease of 'donor proli-
feration', we address this question in Section 5. In
Section 6, we conclude by noting some salient features
of Malawi's aid experience.
2. Malawi as a 'Virtuous Case'
Donors now like to see in Malawi a country whose
government has consistently placed reliance on the
market in resource allocation, has shown restraint in
expanding public sector activities and has taken a
positive view of the role of international trade. That
Malawi's high aggregate growth and export per-
formance in the 1970s was based on agriculture is
another factor which lends credence to the donor view
that other sub-Saharan African countries have a lot to
learn from Malawi's economic policies.
In a well-known paper by Agarwala Ramgopal(1983),
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the elements of which were reproduced in the World
Bank's 1983 World Development Report, a positive
correlation was established between the high GDP
growth rates of the 1970s and the absence of price
distortions in LDC economies. Malawi was placed in a
league of its own among developing countries in its
efforts to avoid price distortions. Malawi scored well
in six of the seven categories of pricing policy
surveyed: it had adopted a flexible exchange rate
policy, afforded minimal protection to local manu-
facturing and had not over-taxed agricultural
producers in the aggregate; wages had been set at or
below their opportunity costs, power tariffs were set at
close to market levels, and inflation had been kept
under control; only capital appeared to be under-
priced.
Despite this almost immaculate bill of health from a
World Bank author, the real position has some
blemishes. Peasant producers of export crops had
been heavily taxed in the 1970s. Then, from 1979
severe budgetary and balance-of-payments problems
emerged. The causes were partly external. The high
cost of the new Eurocurrency borrowing caused a
rapid rise in debt service payments, and higher energy
costs plus a maize harvest failure in 1979/80 put
further strain on foreign exchange requirements. The
export base had remained very narrow (concentration
on a single product, tobacco, had increased to over
50 per cent of export earnings) and worsening transit
difficulties across Mozambique increased the cif cost
of exports and in some cases prevented the shipping of
large volumes of commodity exports.
Agricultural pricing and credit policy in the l970s
stimulated the estates, many of which were now locally
owned, but had inclined towards the impoverishment
of the peasantry with the result that peasant export
crop production declined and the financial surpluses
previously realised by taxing peasants declined with
falling volumes. The actions of aid donors in support
of rural smallholders had little impact in the face of the
squeeze on the profitability of peasant export
agriculture, and had built up severe recurrent cost
obligations which had now accrued to central
government.
After 1979, the IMF and the main donor governments
became primarily concerned to re-establish stability in
Malawi's external payments. However, one of the
main revealed priorities of the Malawi Government
was to avoid future domestic food shortages, as had
occurred in the south of the country in 1980. For the
government, the raising of price incentives for maize
producers consequently took precedence over measures
to stimulate production of export crops. Maize prices
were raised 27 per cent in the 1980-81 season and a
further 68 per cent in the 1981-82 season. As a result, a
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substantial maize supply response was achieved and a
particularly large surplus was generated in 1983-84
(when maize found a ready export market in the
region). This, however, became an uneconomic
surplus in 1985 with over 180,000 tons of maize
stockpiled, and no profitable outlets for this low
value-to-weight crop. This has produced new liquidity
problems for the state purchasing and marketing
agency, ADMARC. Thus the mix of policies as
between support for export crop production and food
output has been different from those prescribed by the
external donors (and the IMF) and more directly
attuned to the government's own political priorities.
Nor is this a new phenomenon. Even before
Independence, there was a constant tension between
the need to maximise foreign exchange earnings and
the local administration's food self-sufficiency targets.
This example is not exceptional. The Malawi
Government was in conflict with donors at various
times in the 1960s and 1970s on spending priorities.
When aid was refused for a new rail link through
Mozambique, the government secured South African
loans instead. Much of the new capital city was
constructed with international borrowing, in defiance
of donor advice. But unlike Tanzania and Nigeria,
Malawi already has a functioning and effective new
capital in place. Even the basis of Malawi's
agricultural policies was not fully in tune with donor
priorities, for the smaliholders on whom external aid
was focused were the subject of government neglect in
favour of estates throughout the 1970s. Furthermore,
Malawi's apparent responsiveness to market forces in
the productive sectors masks the fact that much of the
economy is effectively state-owned through the
medium of Press Holdings, and the control exerted by
the Malawi Congress Party.
Why has Malawi emerged as a virtuous case among
the African 'problem countries' with which donors
have to deal? It is less because of genuine absence of
state intervention or price distortion, than because
Malawi's policy decisions affecting the external sector
could be implemented relatively smoothly by an
authoritarian government, not beholden to powerful
urban interests or organised labour or the military. In
the 1970s, the dominant interest group in economic
policy was large farmers, the President, Dr. Banda,
being the owner of substantial export producing
agricultural enterprises.
3. The Donor Profile
Within the context of sub-Saharan Africa, Malawi
does not appear to be heavily aided given its particular
disadvantages - it is classified as 'least-developed' by
the UN and is completely landlocked. Over 1979-8 1,
Malawi received an annual average of $136 mn in aid
[see Table 1], whereas countries with a similar size of
population but higher levels of per capita income
received considerably more: for instance Zambia's
average ODA receipts over the same period were
$260 mn, while Senegal received $312 mn.
From the table it is apparent that Malawi has a
relatively narrow range of donor support. The bulk of
its concessional external assistance comes from four
sources: two major bilateral donors, the UK and West
Germany, plus two multilateral agencies. On the
multilateral side, the main source of support has been
the World Bank's IDA credits. In the 1980s, however,
Malawi has been categorised by the World Bank as a
'blend country' eligible for harder IBRD loans (the
first Structural Adjustment Loan itself was taken on
IBRD terms), so the degree of concessionality in
finance from this source may tend to diminish. Since
1975, when the first EDF programme was agreed, aid
from the EEC has developed as the second most
important source of multilateral assistance, mostly for
projects but with a few minor drawings from Stabex to
cover certain commodity export earnings losses.
Overall, these four main donors supply over two-
thirds of Malawi's aid. Although some donors are
significant at the intermediate level (Canada has
become less important since its railway building
programme ended, the USA has a surprisingly small
programme, to be increased from 1985 as a result of
the new Economic Policy Initiative for Africa, for
which Malawi aptly qualifies as a market-oriented
economy), what is most striking about Malawi's
donor profile is (a) its concentration among a few large
donors, (b) the absence of several donors one would
expect to see in comparable African countries - most
of the Scandinavian donors and, except for one
exceptional item of project financing, OPEC donors
and (c) the presence of a group of 'unusual' non-DAC
donors; the Republic of South Africa, Taiwan and
Israel.
4. Aid-effectiveness in Malawi
The sectoral impact of aid is best considered via the
project aid interventions which were dominant in the
1970s, before programme lending for structural
adjustment began.
Aid to agriculture has been heavily focused on the
peasant sector. The principal vehicle for this aid has
been integrated rural development projects (IRDPs),
and, at their inception, donors viewed 1RDPs as an
effective form of poverty-focused aid. The production
impact of the IRDPs has been disappointing, mainly
because in the 1970s peasant export crop production
was implicitly taxed heavily through the government
crop marketing board (ADMARC). Other problems
Table 1
Total Malawi ODA receipts net, 1979-82
($m)
Source: OECD Geographical Distribution of Financial
Flows, 1983 Report.
I Excluding South Africa, Taiwan and Israel.
were the impact of increasingly severe land pressure in
peasant farming areas, an initial under-emphasis on
agricultural research on peasant crops except of
cotton and tobacco, an over-ambitious and complex
management structure (especially in the post-1978
National Rural Development Programme), a weak
input distribution system, and the effects of the energy
price increases on the viability of the technicaI
packages' promoted. IRDPs have already placed a
heavy burden on the recurrent budget, leading to
considerable difficulties as donor-financed project
components. However, most of this potential burden
is still to be felt, and is likely to be a critical problem in
the mid-1980s, as more projects come to the end of
their donor-funded phases.
Future donor support to peasant agriculture should
give priority to ensuring a satisfactory macroeconomic
climate (a key feature of the second SAL) and to
improving the efficiency of the marketing system
(which received considerable investment funds in the
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1979 1980 1981 1982 %
Bilateral1
Germany (FR) 28.6 13.2 24.9 21.7 17.9
UK 33.2 25.4 25.0 20.4 16.8
Canada 13.3 9.0 10.0 6.6 5.4
Japan 6.9 11.6 9.9 5.7 4.7
USA 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 3.3
Denmark 2.2 6.0 1.6 3.3 2.7
Total (including
others) 92.0 75.6 82.1 65.2
Multilateral
IDA 13.9 14.3 19.9 26.1 21.5
EEC 12.7 20.6 14.0 10.8 8.9
UNDP 3.6 4.9 8.1 8.0 6.6
African DF 2.0 10.9 6.3 5.9 4.9
OPEC - 1.3 0.5
Total (including
others) 49.7 67.7 55.6 56.2
TOTAL' 141.8 143.4 137.7 121.5 100
1970s). Beyond this, capital aid should continue to
focus on small-farm credit (based on simple, robust
administrative models), and on extending whatever
capital aid may be required to improve the
performance of the marketing system. Malawi's
agricultural research system should be expanded at a
rate consistent with its continued efficiency, and
donors should continue to bear in mind whether, on
particular research problems, enhanced support for
international crop research organisations might prove
a more cost-effective approach to Malawian problems.
Donor interventions in the domestic transport sector
were generally very successful. Starting almost from
scratch at Independence, Malawi now has a near
complete road network, all of it aid-financed. The
Ministry of Works has never built a main road with its
own budget - local resources have been used only for
repairs and maintenance. One road project (in the
Shire Valley) was a conspicuous failure in construction
terms; in another instance, the government requested
roads which duplicated each other, for political
reasons; but donors generally fended off such
approaches. The initial donor-financed extension to
the rail networks, the second route to the coast, was
also viable and, subject to a caveat about Malawi's
present external transport links through Mozambique,
created a new life-line for the export economy. Donor-
supplied ships for the Lake service were sometimes
mis-specified (by the donor) but were adapted locally.
Emergency quick-response aid in this sector also
proved effective - a donor quickly supplied a road
bridge from Zimbabwe stock when one was washed
away, and others responded with alacrity to road
construction projects in the north across the
Tanzanian border when other export routes became
blocked and existing alternatives were imposing
undue cost burdens. Regional transport links have,
however, been rather slow to develop - as much due
to Malawi Government reluctance as to donor
procedures - but SADCC initiatives are improving
this situation.
Malawi's trade patterns have barely changed as a
result of donor involvement. Tobacco has increased its
dominance in exports (and hence Malawi's commodity
vulnerability) but largely as a result of strong world
demand and of directing domestic bank credit to
private operators. Sugar expansion has been largely
financed by loans and equity investment. European
countries still take the bulk of exports (mainly raw
commodities), and South Africa remains the leading
source of imports. Flagging exports have been a
smaller factor in Malawi's balance of payments
difficulties than the debt service burden arising from
borrowing at commercial rates. But compensatory
finance from the IMF has been used twice,
successfully, although drawings on Stabex have been
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small and always less than the claim submitted.
Unfortunately, tobacco, the main export, is not
covered under this scheme.
Donors have not been heavily involved in 'basic
needs', except in the context of 'integrated rural
development projects' - health and primary
education in particular. Some donors admit to an
undue urban bias in their programmes. For the future
concerted donor action for the social services is
needed, which must involve donors being prepared to
fund some recurrent costs as government budgets
continue to make inadequate provision for this sector.
Malawi represents only a small market for Western
capital goods, but most bilateral donors have
responded to the recession by the increasing trade-
orientation in their aid programmes. Normally
procurement tying to source has not been a major
problem - most donors allow derogations to procure
from low-cost regional sources in exceptional
circumstances - but the emergence of mixed credits
and some forms of programme aid has shifted donor
allocations into non-priority sectors such as tele-
communications.
In the 1980s, the leading donor influence on policy has
been the World Bank, which initiated a programme of
structural adjustment lending in 1981. Previously,
World Bank assistance had been almost exclusively
project-based, and focused mainly on smallholder
agricultural development and on transport and energy
infrastructure. Following the 1970 balance-of-pay-
ments crisis and the first in a series of the IMF
agreements, the government requested a SAL in 1980,
and in June 1981, a loan of $45 mn at standard IBRD
terms was approved for disbursement over two years.
During the first SAL, the government implemented
several important 'supply side' reforms. Food prices
to producers were greatly improved and the flagging
tobacco estate sector was reorganised with beneficial
results. These improvements, however, emerged from
the domestic policy-making process, and measures to
stimulate the peasant export sector and to liberalise
wage and price controls, which featured prominantly
in the SAL agreement, were underplayed. Despite a
15 per cent devaluation in 1982, and budgetary
cutbacks, the debt service burden increased, and there
was little progress towards achieving external balance.
The second SAL of $52 mn, on more concessional
IDA terms, was approved in November 1983 and
brought in much tougher corrective requirements as a
condition of the loan agreement. The government
agreed to take steps to improve the performance of the
productive sectors and, in fact, pre-empted the SAL
agreement by raising prices for peasant-produced
export crops in the range of 29 to 50 per cent in March
1983. It also came under pressure to deregulate retail
prices, and in early 1984 a wide range of local products
and services (mostly those with high domestic value-
added) were exempted from price control. The
requirement to restructure Press Holdings and to
rationalise the operations of the parastatals reached
deep into the mechanisms of resource control and
political patronage in the country, but had to be
acceded to. Essentially, Press ceased to be a private
concern of Dr. Banda's, and became a parastatal.
Similarly, the budget deficit problem was addressed by
a series of unpalatable proposals which, on the
revenue side, included raising extra resources from
cost recovery in the educational and health sectors.
The government was, however, also required to reduce
public expenditure on non-productive items which
had earlier resisted cutbacks, such as the continuing
programme for construction of government buildings.
The heavy burden of public recurrent spending, partly
arising from inherited commitments on donor-
financed projects, has, however, yet to be adequately
addressed.
Probably the main impact of the change in World
Bank operations from project finance towards 'policy
lending' has been to offer a model of production-
oriented aid programmes allied to a pre-arranged
reform package which can be followed by the other
main donors. The hardening conditionality of the first
two SALs indicates that, even for a major donor like
the World Bank, its intervention into macroeconomic
policies proved to be a learning process.' Given
Malawi's recent history of success in playing off one
donor against another, there is, however, some
concern that donors may in future stack up behind the
World Bank's guidelines and leave the government
with little room for manoeuvre to develop its own
viable national policies, and that cross-conditionality
between donors and the shorter-term IMF adjustment
packages could also limit the scope of Malawi's
traditional dialogue with individual donors. On
balance, however, if reform proposals are adequately
coordinated, not merely between donors, but in full
consultation with the government, aid-effectiveness
can be further enhanced. We therefore need to
investigate the extent of donor proliferation and the
reality of aid coordination at national level.
5. Donor Proliferation and Institutional
Destruction: Questioning the Evidence
A recent analysis Morss 1984] claims 'institutional
destruction' by donor activity in SSA (at least during
Structural adjustment loans are not analysed in detail in this article.
Readers interested in this aspect of aid-effectiveness in Malawi
should see the paper by Hewitt and Kydd. 'The effectiveness of
structural adjustment lending: initial evidence from Malawi' in
World Development, Vol 14, No 3, 1986.
the 1970s). It is alleged that donor agency proliferation
leads governments to waste time and scarce skilled
manpower (in pandering to donor whims, applying
individual agency headquarters procedures and
requirements, and adjusting national development
policy to prevailing donor fashions), and to alter their
carefully-established spending priorities and economic
planning to suit individual donors. For Malawi, Morss
claims three main forms of this 'institutional
destruction':
Too many donors - 50, according to UNDP;
Nefarious effects from the 800 person-years of
expatriate technical assistance, many in line posts, and
deemed to hinder (or definitively stunt) national
decision-making and managerial capacity;
A donor 'onslaught' of proliferating, unco-
ordinated projects in response to sectoral ministries'
requests.
Morss's evidence seems to be the current conventional
wisdom [World Bank 1985]. Citing the evidence from
several small and medium-sized countries in Africa,
(Kenya, Lesotho, Zambia) and also Malawi where 'the
UNDP has estimated that there were 188 projects from
50 donors' the 1985 World Development Report
alleges that 'in such numbers, the effectiveness of aid
can be severely reduced; . . . the proliferation of
projects may actually have undermined the develop-
ment effort of individual countries',
We dispute these analyses. As shown below, Malawi
deals effectively with a relatively narrow range of main
donors; coordination behind a main donor 'core' is
increasing; and the interventions of peripheral donors
have been rarely obtrusive or obstructive, and
sometimes rather helpful (see (a) below). Also,
particular programmes of technical assistance have
very successfully strengthened the institutional capacity
of the public (and perhaps recently the parastatal)
sector; have embodied a useful training function; and
have gradually evolved into active programmes of
institutional support rather than mere post-colonial
'gap-filling' (sub-section (b)). Finally, project pro-
liferation is simply not the aid reality of today, though
it did have deleterious effects in certain sectors in the
1970s, particularly where donors designed projects at
home without due reference to Malawi's needs and
conditions.
(a) Agency Proliferation
Only eight donors give more than about $5 mn in aid
annually to Malawi. Within this group, there is a core
of four main donors - the UK, West Germany, the
World Bank and the FEC - which maintain
substantial programmes (ie each worth about $20 mn
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per annum). Though not conventionally a con-
cessional source, the IMF should be added to this core,
making five powerful external donor influences. Even
within the narrow range of main donors, there is an
emerging tendency of concentration, certainly on the
part of the two big bilateral donors, the UK and
Germany, behind the strategies of the World Bank
and the IMF (though, like the government, we are
aware of strains between and differing objectives
within these two multilaterial institutions).
Nor have the activities of peripheral donors been
disruptive or conflict-inducing. At the intermediate
level, the African Development Bank has proved an
effective and liberal interlocutor for Malawi's
infrastructured investment programme; the Canadians
have successfully concentrated on railway-building;
the Danes, on small health projects. Even some of the
smaller donors such as South Africa, though poorly
integrated into any multi-donor dialogue, have been
adept at picking up particular projects which had high
political priority for the government and subsequently
proved to be economically justifiable though not
supported by the main donors. Moreover, some
progress has been made on important development
issues such as population policy - in the form of
'birth spacing' proposals - thanks largely to the more
peripheral donors who have relatively few interests at
stake. Nor is Malawi afflicted by a proliferation of
small non-governmental agencies: the evidence is
rather to the contrary, since many of the more soially
conscious development and relief agencies have either
not been attracted to Malawi or have run down their
programmes there.
A more pertinent question than 'are there too many
donors?' is the extent to which both the bilateral
donors and the Malawi government can be consulted
early in the formulation of macroeconomic adjustment
programmes, which loom large in multilateral aid in
the 1980s. The evidence here has not always been
reassuring. Of the main donor agencies, only the UK
and the EEC have a local representation in the form of
an office including economic and technical specialists
dealing specifically with development assistance. The
others operate through embassies (often merely
through a locally-based commercial attache). The
World Bank, until 1985, had no local office, and
operated through visits.
(b) Technical Assistance
Of the UK aid programme (which for historical
reasons has always been the largest in Malawi) some
55 per cent - ie about £13 mn out of25 mn annually
- now comprises manpower support. This has been
broadly the case ever since Independence. The second
largest TA programme is UNDP (about $8 mn per
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year). In 1983, of 600 expatriates in middle and senior
positions, half were British-supplemented. British TA
is unusual in its longstanding emphasis on salary
supplementation of expatriates in post, rather than (as
in the case of UNDP and others) short-term contracts
to supply experts or project-linked TA. Where the
Malawi authorities have wanted to localise key civil
service posts, there has been little or no evidence of
donor opposition or obstruction (indeed, localisation
may recently have proceeded too fast as a result of UK
policy shifts from supplementation towards fewer, but
fully-funded, TA posts), nor of donor intervention in
the national decision-making process through the TA
supplementation programme. This succeeded in
keeping a competent body of experienced people in
post in the national administration. This continuity in
experience enhanced institutional competence through
their training function. It assisted, in particular, the
administration's capacity for project preparation and
implementation, especially when dealing with donor
agencies.
Two-thirds of Malawi's overseas training is now
financed by bilateral aid, compared with one-third
three years ago. Donors are now more alert to
integrating TA support into sectoral programmes. In
the case of the UK, supplemented personnel are now
more concentrated in Education (which itself absorbs
about 50 per cent of the UK supplemented staff in
post), Works and Natural Resources. An even more
valuable training and policy review function could be
provided if donor TA representatives systematically
conducted aid evaluations with Malawians, and
reported to an impartial body removed from the aid
planning and implementation process.
(e) Project Proliferation
At any time in recent years, the Malawi Government
has been implementing 80 to 100 donor-financed
projects, plus 20-25 with 'own resources'. (By
subdividing projects in component parts, one could
arguably reach 188 [see World Bank 1985).) But the
government's development policy document presented
to the 1984 International Conference on Partners in
Development lists approximately 200 discrete
development projects (36 in agriculture alone) for
fuñding over the three-year period 1983/86. The
second volume covering the five-year period 1984/85
to 1988/9 lists 167 projects. Large though these figures
may be, they appear commensurate with the needs and
implemention capacity of Malawi's varied economy
and diversified public service.
Moreover, project numbers have shrunk in recent
years. Key donors and lenders such as the World Bank
and IMF have stepped up the share and volume of
programme lending. Other agencies, notably the UK's
ODA, have been at pains to narrow down therange of
small project interventions and to initiate programmes
of sectoral support (integrating TA, capital aid and
import support for key development sectors). Also,
such donors have made aid conditional upon the
pursuit of internationally agreed sectoral targets and
policies under the aegis of World Bank Structural
Adjustment programmes. Finally, some 'project
consolidation' (particularly in the agricultural sector
under the National Rural Development Programme)
is occurring. Project proliferation is simply not the aid
reality of today.
This is not to claim that project proliferation in the
1970s can be completely dismissed as a barrier to
aid-effectiveness. Donor-designed agricultural projects
have built up unwarranted recurrent costs for the local
administration to inherit. Another problem induced
by a decade of multi-donor operations has been the
institutional response within the government, and
specifically within the Office of the President and
Cabinet. A separate division, the Development
Division has been set up therein, parallel to the
Economic Planning Division and separate from the
Treasury (which ultimately coordinates aid offers and
departmental spending priorities). The raison d'etre of
the Development Division has become, perhaps
naturally but nevertheless unproductively, to
administer development initiatives in the form of
projects. Thus, even in the more straitened circum-
stances of the 1980s, the Division was until very
recently encouraging new project submissions rather
than coordinating programme aid requirements and
consolidating the project initiatives sponsored by the
range of donors already present in Malawi. Reforms
were introduced in 1984-85. Nor have bilateral donors
been averse to 'projectising' initiatives which might
more suitably be supplied in other forms: we cited the
example earlier of export-oriented donor trade
strategies influencing the provision of specific capital
goods in mixed credit projects.
Lastly, we can illustrate some of the pitfalls on the
donor side when devising project interventions.
Without a strong local bureaucracy, it is possible for
donors to arrive equipped with outside models for
projects devised either to meet requirements in an
alien environment or simply to suit the sort of mix of
goods and services which donors wish to unload. With
due deference to individual donors, it is probably
worth citing two instances of inappropriate project
design. The German model of 'rural growth centres'
was in fact a model of growth poles devised in Berlin
for use in small border communities in West Germany
which had become spatially marginalised with the
division of Germany and the erection of the Iron
Curtain. Such models have of course some scope for
adaptation, but it is clear that this was not the most
fruitful starting point for enlivening rural communities
in Malawi. Nor could the adapted model, with its
heavy emphasis on costly municipal infrastructure
which local district councils could not possibly
support even on a minimal cost recovery basis (given
the very low incomes of rural Malawians) have been
worthwhile. Though the Ministry of Agriculture
resisted the project proposal, it was nevertheless
proceeded with, and absorbed both local and donor
funding by being placed with a special unit within the
Office of the President and Cabinet.
Another foreign project design had a different genesis.
The UNDP-sponsored programme of low-cost rural
housing schemes evolved from an international
conference on low-cost housing methods. Such
conferences tend inevitably to propose general
solutions to general problems and the result was less
than adequately Malawi-specific. Although designed
to provide low-cost rural housing, the project as
implemented so far has been neither low-cost (in
relation to normal rural housing built without donor
assistance) nor rural - the main project has been
executed in Zomba, formerly the national capital.
These examples do not however undermine the
general finding that donor support has been generally
well-coordinated, focused on the leading agricultural
production sector and on the country's infrastructure
base (with perhaps inadequate attention to the
primary education and health sectors) and that far
from proliferating, aid interventions are becoming
increasingly directed behind the major adjustment
strategies in the 1980s. A major government ambition
behind the organisation of the UN-sponsored Donors'
Round Table in 1984 was in fact to extend Malawi's
network of donors into unfamiliar territory (OPEC
multilaterals, Arab national agencies, Scandinavian
donors) and thus to extend the project mix on offer to
Malawi.
6. Key Factors from Malawi's Aid Experience
Malawi is seen as a relatively successful case among
the aid-assisted economies of Africa because its
economy managed to grow fast from a relatively low
base, securing high aggregate returns on investments,
especially in the l970s, and because the policies
adopted domestically never flinched from a single-
minded concentration on the agricultural sector. Even
when, in the 1980s, donors began to adopt a new role
of administering corrective medicine to an ailing
economy, Malawi's performance in recovery has been
impressive. On crucial issues of national interest, the
government was careful to undertake certain key
policy reforms before they became a source of dispute
with the donors. For instance, the inefficiencies of the
large farm sector were addressed by direct action
83
through the commercial banks, and producer prices
for maize raised by government action long before the
issue of relative pricing policy between food and
export crops could harden into a dispute with the
World Bank. Wherever possible, Malawi seems to
have taken pre-emptive action rather than let issues
slide into confrontation with the donors. Implementing
unpalatable policy reforms is never easy; for that
reason some governments may prefer to use an
external agent as scapegoat for its austerity
programme. Malawi has adopted a different stance.
Since the government had never been forced to depend
on powerful non-agrarian interests, in the public
sector and among the military, it was able to secure the
backing of agricultural interests which were not averse
to devaluation, public spending cuts and wage
restraint, when pressures for external stabilisation
required such measures.
The policy environment in which donors operate has
also been assisted by the relatively narrow range of
donors operating in Malawi. The tendency towards
concentration has increased in recent years as bilateral
donors began to link their aid projects to the structural
reforms agreed with the multilateral bodies. The
converse of this situation is that Malawi remains a
relatively under-aided country, there being very few
'footloose' donors present who are prepared to pick
up marginal projects. But because there is still
competition among donors to secure the best projects,
in general there have been fewer 'white elephants' than
could be observed in several neighbouring countries.
Malawi's strategy for dealing with donors contributing
to nation-wide sectoral programmes has also been
effective. For instance, under the current national
rural development programme, the government
endeavours to associate an individual donor with a
single agricultural development division and so
concentrate its resources in a given area,
Because Malawi was so bereft of a basic transport
network at Independence, and because its international
links have needed to be progressively reoriented
towards the eastern ports and the northern access
route, nearly all the aid for major infrastructure
projects in the transport sector has proved its worth.
Such projects gave an indirect boost to agricultural
marketing and exports, and have been much more
easy to manage and implement than projects aimed at
directly stimulating peasant production. They also
appeal more to bilateral donors since they embody
more capital equipment which can be supplied under
tied aid. This argument can however be taken to
extremes, and donor competition for supply contracts
in the telecommunications sector, for example, tends
to distort the country's investment priorities.
Malawi's policies on localisation, whether in govern-
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ment or in the private sector have been very restrained,
at least as regards fairly senior posts. As a result,
Malawi has been able to obtain the benefits of long-
term technical assistance which proved an important
vehicle for institution building, while other govern-
ments curtailed this crucial manpower input for
narrow nationalistic reasons but were later obliged to
reverse their policies under donor pressure.
Lastly, Malawi's effective use of resources, whether
external aid or domestic, was helped by its general
policy of conservatism. This meant that the Malawi
Treasury was never totally in awe of aid donors
bearing gifts, but consistently kept the issues of
recurrent costs arising from donor intervention in its
agenda for discussions with the donors. The
Treasury's strong control over the sectoral ministries
also meant that project proposals had to be carefully
ranked in order of priority. Although a few striking
examples of public expenditure projects of low merit
slipped through the net - it would be dishonest to
conclude this article without a mention of some
extravagances on presidential palaces - in general,
donors were assured by the strength of the centralised
and autocratic administrative machinery that their
projects were of genuine high developmental priority,
and that there was little shunting of donor resources to
fund consumption expenditures.
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